

V. SIMULATED CONSEQUENCES OF A RECESSION FOR FOOD STAMP PROGRAM OUTCOMES UNDER WELFARE REFORM

A. DESCRIPTION OF OUTCOMES

In this chapter, we present the results of simulations of the consequences of an economic recession for FSP caseloads, costs, and characteristics, assuming recently introduced welfare reform policies remain in effect. We first consider six major outcomes describing FSP participation and costs:

1. The total number of participating food stamp units per state
2. The participation rate of eligible food stamp units per state
3. The total number of individuals receiving food stamps per state
4. The total food stamp benefits paid per state
5. Average food stamp benefits paid per unit
6. Average number of individuals per participating food stamp unit

We then consider six major outcomes describing the characteristics of households receiving food stamps:

1. The total number of food stamp households per state receiving AFDC/TANF
2. The total number of food stamp households per state with earnings
3. The total number of food stamp households per state receiving AFDC/TANF plus earnings
4. The percentage of food stamp households per state receiving AFDC/TANF
5. The percentage of food stamp households per state with earnings
6. The percentage of households receiving AFDC/TANF plus earnings

As noted in Chapter II, our focus in these simulations is to see the percentage change, by state, in the above outcomes arising from state unemployment rates reverting to their 1990-1992 levels

from their 1996-1998 levels. We focus once again on comparing simulated outcomes for the *last month* of a three-year simulation. Consequently, the results we discuss below indicate the consequences of unemployment rates rising from their December 1998 levels to their December 1992 levels.

In the following section, we describe the anticipated effects of a recession on simulated FSP outcomes. We then describe the simulated consequences of a recession for the national FSP and for FSP outcomes in individual states. We also consider whether the simulated effects of a recession differ according to the type of welfare reform program in place in particular states.

B. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS

We expected that a recession would lead to higher simulated levels of FSP participation and benefits because MATH STEWARD assumes that a higher unemployment rate reduces the “stigma” for both food stamps-only participation and AFDC/TANF plus food stamps participation (Jacobson et al 1998). Because MATH STEWARD assumes that this reduction in “stigma” is greater for AFDC/TANF than for food stamps only, we expected that a recession would increase the number of AFDC/TANF households by a larger percentage than it would increase the number of FSP households. We also expected the increases in FSP caseloads and costs, and in AFDC/TANF participation, would be greater in states simulated to experience a more severe recession, as indicated by a larger gap between the 1998 and 1992 unemployment rates, but would not necessarily vary according to the type of welfare reform in a particular state.

C. CONSEQUENCES OF A RECESSION FOR FSP OUTCOMES NATIONALLY AND IN INDIVIDUAL STATES

1. FSP Caseloads and Costs

MATH STEWARD simulations suggest that a recession will lead to modest increases in FSP caseloads and cost. Aggregating results across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the model estimated a 10.7 percent increase in the number of food stamp units under welfare reform, a 12.2 percent increase in the participation rate of eligible food stamp units, a 12.1 percent increase in the number of individuals receiving food stamps, and a 13.3 percent increase in the total food stamp benefits paid (Table V.1).¹ Average food stamp benefits per unit, and the average size of a food stamp unit, were simulated to have little change by a recession.

Across the individual states, there was considerable variation in the simulated impact of a recession on FSP participation and costs (Table V.1). For Massachusetts, simulated increases in FSP participation and costs were substantial: a 27 percent increase in the number of units receiving food stamps, a 30 percent increase in the FSP participation rate, 30 percent increase in the number of individuals receiving food stamps, and a 31 percent increase in total food stamp benefits. For Hawaii, the simulation indicated a reduction in each of these outcomes by 9 to 13 percent. A major factor distinguishing these two states is the percentage-point change in each

¹The reason that the percentage increase in the FSP participation rate exceeds the percentage increase in the number of participating FSP units is that the model simulates the number of eligible FSP units as *declining* slightly during the recession. This counter-intuitive and unreasonable result arises because the Version 1996.41 wage equations impute *higher* earnings for workers in states with higher unemployment rates, all else held equal. We believe that the underlying coefficients in the wage equations are the result of a spurious correlation between high-wage states and states with high unemployment rates between 1992 and 1994. We reestimated the wage equations for Versions 1996.70 and 1996.80 of MATH STEWARD, but found the results obtained using these later versions of the model to be inferior to the Version 1996.41 results on other grounds. See Appendix A for details.

TABLE V.1
Food Stamp Participation and Costs: Simulated Change from a Recession

	<i>Units Receiving Food Stamps</i>	<i>Participation Rate of Eligible Units</i>	<i>Individuals Receiving Food Stamps</i>	<i>Total Food Stamp Benefits Paid</i>	<i>Average Food Stamp Benefits per Unit</i>	<i>Average Size of Food Stamp Unit</i>
<i>Percentage Change from Returning from 1998 to 1992 Unemployment Rates</i>						
National	10.7	12.2	12.1	13.3	2.4	1.32
Alabama	9.2	11.0	10.9	12.4	2.9	1.62
Alaska	8.4	10.7	8.8	7.4	-0.8	0.41
Arizona	18.3	19.8	19.2	23.0	4.0	0.82
Arkansas	6.7	7.9	8.7	11.2	4.2	1.85
California	15.9	18.3	16.8	16.8	0.8	0.80
Colorado	9.4	11.2	9.9	11.8	2.2	0.40
Connecticut	15.4	17.3	17.0	16.2	0.7	1.39
Delaware	5.1	5.9	6.5	7.4	2.2	1.26
District of Columbia	0.0	0.3	-0.3	-0.7	-0.7	-0.29
Florida	12.5	13.9	14.5	17.0	4.0	1.84
Georgia	6.0	7.0	7.1	8.2	2.1	1.11
Hawaii	-9.0	-9.8	-10.6	-12.6	-4.0	-1.81
Idaho	3.1	3.7	3.9	5.6	2.5	0.78
Illinois	10.3	11.5	12.6	14.5	3.8	2.10
Indiana	11.8	14.2	14.4	19.3	6.7	2.26
Iowa	8.1	9.2	10.0	11.4	3.0	1.73
Kansas	2.9	3.7	3.7	4.4	1.5	0.81
Kentucky	7.9	9.2	9.5	11.7	3.5	1.51
Louisiana	5.6	6.8	6.6	8.8	3.1	0.93
Maine	7.5	9.4	8.5	10.3	2.5	0.87
Maryland	7.1	8.6	8.8	9.6	2.3	1.56
Massachusetts	27.0	29.8	30.0	31.1	3.3	2.39
Michigan	19.8	22.0	23.8	27.0	6.0	3.30
Minnesota	11.2	12.8	12.2	13.3	1.9	0.88
Mississippi	7.6	8.5	7.9	10.0	2.3	0.31
Missouri	9.3	10.9	11.9	15.0	5.2	2.43
Montana	2.5	3.1	3.0	3.6	1.1	0.49
Nebraska	2.1	2.3	1.7	2.8	0.7	-0.41
Nevada	16.9	19.0	20.0	24.1	6.1	2.62
New Hampshire	23.3	26.2	26.5	26.8	2.8	2.63
New Jersey	12.4	14.6	13.7	14.8	2.1	1.19
New Mexico	4.3	5.2	4.7	4.7	0.4	0.38
New York	9.8	11.2	10.5	10.4	0.5	0.62
North Carolina	8.8	10.0	9.6	11.3	2.4	0.78
North Dakota	9.8	10.8	11.2	12.0	2.0	1.33
Ohio	11.0	12.7	14.2	16.0	4.5	2.85
Oklahoma	5.9	6.8	7.6	8.3	2.3	1.65
Oregon	8.6	9.9	9.8	11.6	2.7	1.03
Pennsylvania	8.6	10.2	9.3	10.7	1.9	0.65
Rhode Island	18.3	19.7	19.9	19.4	1.0	1.33
South Carolina	9.1	11.0	10.9	13.9	4.5	1.73
South Dakota	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.6	1.3	0.82
Tennessee	6.8	7.7	8.1	9.3	2.4	1.22
Texas	9.0	10.0	9.3	9.6	0.6	0.27
Utah	8.7	9.2	10.3	12.0	3.0	1.47
Vermont	8.1	9.7	8.7	8.5	0.4	0.53
Virginia	9.2	10.8	10.3	11.8	2.4	1.05
Washington	11.5	13.3	10.8	11.8	0.2	-0.69
West Virginia	15.4	17.2	16.0	20.9	4.8	0.54
Wisconsin	6.7	7.4	8.4	8.6	1.7	1.54
Wyoming	3.2	3.9	3.5	4.3	1.1	0.37

state's unemployment rate from 1998 to 1992 levels. Massachusetts' unemployment rate was simulated as increasing by more than four percentage points during the recession, while Hawaii's unemployment rate was simulated as *decreasing* by about one percentage point.

2. FSP Caseload Characteristics

If state unemployment rates rise from their 1998 levels to their 1992 levels with welfare reform policies remaining in place, the proportionate increase in national TANF participation would be higher than the proportionate increase in national FSP participation. Aggregating results across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the model estimated nearly a 22.6 percent increase in the number of food stamp households with TANF (Table V.2). Because the number of food stamp households increased by 10.7 percent in response to the recession, the simulated change in the proportion of food stamp households with TANF was smaller (11 percent).

Across the individual states, there was also considerable variation in the simulated impact of a recession under welfare reform on TANF participation. For Massachusetts, simulated increases in TANF participation were substantial: there was a 66.7 percent increase in the number of food stamp households with TANF and a 32.6 percent increase in the proportion of food stamp households with TANF. In contrast, for Hawaii, the model simulated a 16.3 percent *reduction* in the number of food stamp households with TANF and a 7.8 percent reduction in the proportion of food stamp households with TANF. As noted above, a major factor distinguishing these two states is their unemployment rates during the simulated recession.

TABLE V.2
Food Stamp Program Characteristics: Simulated Change from a Recession

	<i>Number of FS Households with TANF</i>	<i>Number of FS Households with Earnings</i>	<i>Number of FS Households with TANF and Earnings</i>	<i>% of FS Households with TANF</i>	<i>% of FS Households with Earnings</i>	<i>% of FS Households with TANF and Earnings</i>
<i>Percentage Change from Returning from 1998 to 1992 Unemployment Rates</i>						
National	22.6	9.4	23.8	11.0	-0.9	12.1
Alabama	20.8	10.6	27.8	10.5	1.1	16.8
Alaska	18.2	6.5	19.7	8.6	-2.1	10.0
Arizona	38.3	17.1	41.7	18.7	0.5	21.6
Arkansas	21.9	8.1	25.1	14.5	1.5	17.5
California	24.3	13.0	23.1	7.5	-2.2	6.5
Colorado	19.7	6.7	21.1	10.0	-2.0	11.3
Connecticut	34.6	14.4	38.9	17.5	-0.1	21.2
Delaware	13.4	3.6	14.8	7.5	-1.8	8.8
District of Columbia	0.0	5.3	3.2	0.2	5.4	3.4
Florida	34.3	12.5	38.7	19.6	0.2	23.5
Georgia	13.7	4.3	12.0	6.9	-1.9	5.3
Hawaii	-16.3	-7.2	-13.9	-7.8	2.2	-5.2
Idaho	9.0	1.3	9.0	6.7	-0.8	6.7
Illinois	23.3	11.9	27.7	11.2	1.0	15.2
Indiana	35.8	5.7	27.5	21.7	-5.3	14.3
Iowa	19.7	7.2	19.1	11.2	-0.4	10.7
Kansas	7.7	2.2	6.1	4.8	-0.6	3.2
Kentucky	19.4	5.1	18.0	10.6	-2.7	9.3
Louisiana	14.4	4.6	14.4	8.4	-0.9	8.4
Maine	15.1	4.4	10.2	6.8	-3.1	2.3
Maryland	14.5	7.4	15.5	6.4	-0.2	7.3
Massachusetts	66.7	22.4	69.2	32.6	-2.6	34.6
Michigan	42.6	15.7	40.5	19.6	-3.0	17.9
Minnesota	24.6	9.6	23.1	13.3	-0.4	11.9
Mississippi	16.6	5.8	14.1	8.2	-1.8	5.9
Missouri	23.3	6.9	18.1	13.1	-1.9	8.3
Montana	6.9	1.5	6.8	4.1	-1.1	4.0
Nebraska	6.8	1.1	6.1	5.0	-0.6	4.3
Nevada	42.1	18.0	46.9	22.6	1.8	26.8
New Hampshire	53.2	20.6	49.7	24.7	-1.8	21.9
New Jersey	24.3	10.6	26.8	11.3	-0.9	13.5
New Mexico	7.5	1.9	3.8	3.6	-1.8	0.0
New York	17.3	8.5	18.5	7.1	-0.9	8.2
North Carolina	21.8	6.2	19.3	11.7	-2.6	9.4
North Dakota	25.5	7.7	25.4	15.5	-0.9	15.5
Ohio	21.5	12.4	26.9	9.4	1.3	14.3
Oklahoma	15.1	5.3	16.1	8.7	-0.5	9.6
Oregon	19.8	8.7	16.4	9.9	-0.3	6.7
Pennsylvania	17.9	4.7	14.2	8.9	-3.4	5.4
Rhode Island	32.9	17.7	40.5	13.3	0.3	19.8
South Carolina	28.8	5.5	30.2	18.1	-3.3	19.4
South Dakota	7.5	1.6	5.2	4.9	-0.8	2.7
Tennessee	16.1	6.5	15.6	8.9	-0.1	8.4
Texas	20.2	8.9	27.8	11.0	0.6	18.0
Utah	18.6	6.9	18.0	9.4	-1.4	8.8
Vermont	17.3	7.3	19.6	8.7	-0.5	10.9
Virginia	24.9	5.9	21.1	13.6	-3.7	10.1
Washington	18.4	11.9	22.0	6.7	0.9	9.9
West Virginia	33.0	12.6	49.9	18.4	0.2	33.4
Wisconsin	17.6	5.3	17.1	10.1	-1.4	9.6
Wyoming	7.7	2.0	7.7	4.3	-1.2	4.4

D. CONSEQUENCES OF A RECESSION FOR FSP OUTCOMES, BY TYPE OF STATE WELFARE REFORM

1. FSP Caseloads and Costs

To help interpret the relationship between various types of welfare reform policies and simulated changes in FSP outcomes under a recession, we relied on the same groups of states identified in Chapter III (see Table III.3). With eight possible combinations of state welfare reform policies, we might expect a pattern to emerge. The increases in FSP participation and costs during a recession appear to be somewhat larger in states with shorter TANF time limits (Table V.3). The impact of a recession on state FSP caseloads averaged 7.7 to 15.8 percent in states with shorter time limits, and 6.8 to 10 percent in states with longer time limits. The impact of a recession on state FSP costs averaged 11.4 to 19.5 percent in states with shorter time limits, and 8.7 to 11.8 percent in states with longer time limits.

2. FSP Caseload Characteristics

Likewise, the increase during a recession in the number of food stamp households with TANF benefits was simulated to be larger in states with shorter TANF time limits (see Table V.4). The impact of a recession on the number of TANF households per state averaged 21.3 to 38.3 percent in states with shorter time limits, and 15.2 to 20 percent in states with longer time limits. Note that the MATH STEWARD model discounts the value of time-limited TANF benefits when calculating disposable income, making TANF less appealing to households when time limits are shorter. These simulations suggest that, during a recession, households are less likely to opt out participation in time-limited TANF programs, because high unemployment rates leave them fewer economic alternatives.

TABLE V.3
Food Stamp Participation and Costs: Simulated Change from a Recession
By Type of Welfare Reform

	<i>Units Receiving Food Stamps</i>	<i>Participation Rate of Eligible Units</i>	<i>Individuals Receiving Food Stamps</i>	<i>Total Food Stamp Benefits Paid</i>	<i>Average Food Stamp Benefits per Unit</i>	<i>Average Size of Food Stamp Unit</i>
<i>Percentage Change from Returning from 1998 to 1992 Unemployment Rates</i>						
National	10.7	12.2	12.1	13.3	2.4	1.32
Shorter Time Limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Arkansas	6.7	7.9	8.7	11.2	4.2	1.85
Florida	12.5	13.9	14.5	17.0	4.0	1.84
Idaho	3.1	3.7	3.9	5.6	2.5	0.78
Oregon	8.6	9.9	9.8	11.6	2.7	1.03
Average	7.7	8.9	9.2	11.4	3.4	1.4
Longer Time Limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Iowa	8.1	9.2	10.0	11.4	3.0	1.73
New Jersey	12.4	14.6	13.7	14.8	2.1	1.19
Oklahoma	5.9	6.8	7.6	8.3	2.3	1.65
Utah	8.7	9.2	10.3	12.0	3.0	1.47
Average	8.8	10.0	10.4	11.6	2.6	1.5
Shorter Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Indiana	11.8	14.2	14.4	19.3	6.7	2.26
Tennessee	6.8	7.7	8.1	9.3	2.4	1.22
Average	9.3	10.9	11.2	14.3	4.5	1.7
Longer Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Colorado	9.4	11.2	9.9	11.8	2.2	0.40
Delaware	5.1	5.9	6.5	7.4	2.2	1.26
Michigan	19.8	22.0	23.8	27.0	6.0	3.30
Montana	2.5	3.1	3.0	3.6	1.1	0.49
North Dakota	9.8	10.8	11.2	12.0	2.0	1.33
South Dakota	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.6	1.3	0.82
Wisconsin	6.7	7.4	8.4	8.6	1.7	1.54
Wyoming	3.2	3.9	3.5	4.3	1.1	0.37
Average	7.4	8.4	8.7	9.8	2.2	1.2
Shorter Time Limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Connecticut	15.4	17.3	17.0	16.2	0.7	1.39
Illinois	10.3	11.5	12.6	14.5	3.8	2.10
Massachusetts	27.0	29.8	30.0	31.1	3.3	2.39
Nevada	16.9	19.0	20.0	24.1	6.1	2.62
Virginia	9.2	10.8	10.3	11.8	2.4	1.05
Average	15.8	17.7	18.0	19.5	3.3	1.9

TABLE V.3
Food Stamp Participation and Costs: Simulated Change from a Recession
By Type of Welfare Reform

	<i>Units Receiving Food Stamps</i>	<i>Participation Rate of Eligible Units</i>	<i>Individuals Receiving Food Stamps</i>	<i>Total Food Stamp Benefits Paid</i>	<i>Average Food Stamp Benefits per Unit</i>	<i>Average Size of Food Stamp Unit</i>
<i>Percentage Change from Returning from 1998 to 1992 Unemployment Rates</i>						
Longer Time Limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Alabama	9.2	11.0	10.9	12.4	2.9	1.62
California	15.9	18.3	16.8	16.8	0.8	0.80
Hawaii	-9.0	-9.8	-10.6	-12.6	-4.0	-1.81
Kansas	2.9	3.7	3.7	4.4	1.5	0.81
Minnesota	11.2	12.8	12.2	13.3	1.9	0.88
Mississippi	7.6	8.5	7.9	10.0	2.3	0.31
New Hampshire	23.3	26.2	26.5	26.8	2.8	2.63
New Mexico	4.3	5.2	4.7	4.7	0.4	0.38
New York	9.8	11.2	10.5	10.4	0.5	0.62
Ohio	11.0	12.7	14.2	16.0	4.5	2.85
Pennsylvania	8.6	10.2	9.3	10.7	1.9	0.65
Rhode Island	18.3	19.7	19.9	19.4	1.0	1.33
Washington	11.5	13.3	10.8	11.8	0.2	-0.69
West Virginia	15.4	17.2	16.0	20.9	4.8	0.54
Average	10.0	11.4	10.9	11.8	1.5	0.8
Shorter Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Arizona	18.3	19.8	19.2	23.0	4.0	0.82
Louisiana	5.6	6.8	6.6	8.8	3.1	0.93
Nebraska	2.1	2.3	1.7	2.8	0.7	-0.41
North Carolina	8.8	10.0	9.6	11.3	2.4	0.78
South Carolina	9.1	11.0	10.9	13.9	4.5	1.73
Texas	9.0	10.0	9.3	9.6	0.6	0.27
Average	8.8	10.0	9.6	11.6	2.5	0.7
Longer Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Alaska	8.4	10.7	8.8	7.4	-0.8	0.41
District of Columbia	0.0	0.3	-0.3	-0.7	-0.7	-0.29
Georgia	6.0	7.0	7.1	8.2	2.1	1.11
Kentucky	7.9	9.2	9.5	11.7	3.5	1.51
Maine	7.5	9.4	8.5	10.3	2.5	0.87
Maryland	7.1	8.6	8.8	9.6	2.3	1.56
Missouri	9.3	10.9	11.9	15.0	5.2	2.43
Vermont	8.1	9.7	8.7	8.5	0.4	0.53
Average	6.8	8.2	7.9	8.7	1.8	1.0

TABLE V.4
Food Stamp Program Characteristics: Simulated Change from a Recession
By Type of Welfare Reform

	<i>Number of FS Households with TANF</i>	<i>Number of FS Households with Earnings</i>	<i>Number of FS Households with TANF and Earnings</i>	<i>% of FS Households with TANF</i>	<i>% of FS Households with Earnings</i>	<i>% of FS Households with TANF and Earnings</i>
<i>Percentage Change from Returning from 1998 to 1992 Unemployment Rates</i>						
National	22.6	9.4	23.8	11.0	-0.9	12.1
Shorter time limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Arkansas	21.9	8.1	25.1	14.5	1.5	17.5
Florida	34.3	12.5	38.7	19.6	0.2	23.5
Idaho	9.0	1.3	9.0	6.7	-0.8	6.7
Oregon	19.8	8.7	16.4	9.9	-0.3	6.7
Average	21.3	7.7	22.3	12.7	0.1	13.6
Longer Time Limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Iowa	19.7	7.2	19.1	11.2	-0.4	10.7
New Jersey	24.3	10.6	26.8	11.3	-0.9	13.5
Oklahoma	15.1	5.3	16.1	8.7	-0.5	9.6
Utah	18.6	6.9	18.0	9.4	-1.4	8.8
Average	19.4	7.5	20.0	10.1	-0.8	10.7
Shorter Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Tennessee	16.1	6.5	15.6	8.9	-0.1	8.4
Indiana	35.8	5.7	27.5	21.7	-5.3	14.3
Average	25.9	6.1	21.6	15.3	-2.7	11.4
Longer Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Aggressive Work Requirements						
Colorado	19.7	6.7	21.1	10.0	-2.0	11.3
Delaware	13.4	3.6	14.8	7.5	-1.8	8.8
Michigan	42.6	15.7	40.5	19.6	-3.0	17.9
Montana	6.9	1.5	6.8	4.1	-1.1	4.0
North Dakota	25.5	7.7	25.4	15.5	-0.9	15.5
South Dakota	7.5	1.6	5.2	4.9	-0.8	2.7
Wisconsin	17.6	5.3	17.1	10.1	-1.4	9.6
Wyoming	7.7	2.0	7.7	4.3	-1.2	4.4
Average	17.6	5.5	17.3	9.5	-1.5	9.3
Shorter Time Limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Connecticut	34.6	14.4	38.9	17.5	-0.1	21.2
Illinois	23.3	11.9	27.7	11.2	1.0	15.2
Massachusetts	66.7	22.4	69.2	32.6	-2.6	34.6
Nevada	42.1	18.0	46.9	22.6	1.8	26.8
Virginia	24.9	5.9	21.1	13.6	-3.7	10.1
Average	38.3	14.5	40.7	19.5	-0.7	21.6

TABLE V.4
Food Stamp Program Characteristics: Simulated Change from a Recession
By Type of Welfare Reform

	<i>Number of FS Households with TANF</i>	<i>Number of FS Households with Earnings</i>	<i>Number of FS Households with TANF and Earnings</i>	<i>% of FS Households with TANF</i>	<i>% of FS Households with Earnings</i>	<i>% of FS Households with TANF and Earnings</i>
<i>Percentage Change from Returning from 1998 to 1992 Unemployment Rates</i>						
Longer Time Limits, Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Alabama	20.8	10.6	27.8	10.5	1.1	16.8
California	24.3	13.0	23.1	7.5	-2.2	6.5
Hawaii	-16.3	-7.2	-13.9	-7.8	2.2	-5.2
Kansas	7.7	2.2	6.1	4.8	-0.6	3.2
Minnesota	24.6	9.6	23.1	13.3	-0.4	11.9
Mississippi	16.6	5.8	14.1	8.2	-1.8	5.9
New Hampshire	53.2	20.6	49.7	24.7	-1.8	21.9
New Mexico	7.5	1.9	3.8	3.6	-1.8	0.0
New York	17.3	8.5	18.5	7.1	-0.9	8.2
Ohio	21.5	12.4	26.9	9.4	1.3	14.3
Pennsylvania	17.9	4.7	14.2	8.9	-3.4	5.4
Rhode Island	32.9	17.7	40.5	13.3	0.3	19.8
Washington	18.4	11.9	22.0	6.7	0.9	9.9
West Virginia	33.0	12.6	49.9	18.4	0.2	33.4
Average	20.0	8.9	21.8	9.2	-0.5	10.9
Shorter Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Arizona	38.3	17.1	41.7	18.7	0.5	21.6
Louisiana	14.4	4.6	14.4	8.4	-0.9	8.4
Nebraska	6.8	1.1	6.1	5.0	-0.6	4.3
North Carolina	21.8	6.2	19.3	11.7	-2.6	9.4
South Carolina	28.8	5.5	30.2	18.1	-3.3	19.4
Texas	20.2	8.9	27.8	11.0	0.6	18.0
Average	21.7	7.2	23.3	12.1	-1.0	13.5
Longer Time Limits, Less Generous Earned Income Disregards, Less Aggressive Work Requirements						
Alaska	18.2	6.5	19.7	8.6	-2.1	10.0
District of Columbia	0.0	5.3	3.2	0.2	5.4	3.4
Georgia	13.7	4.3	12.0	6.9	-1.9	5.3
Kentucky	19.4	5.1	18.0	10.6	-2.7	9.3
Maine	15.1	4.4	10.2	6.8	-3.1	2.3
Maryland	14.5	7.4	15.5	6.4	-0.2	7.3
Missouri	23.3	6.9	18.1	13.1	-1.9	8.3
Vermont	17.3	7.3	19.6	8.7	-0.5	10.9
Average	15.2	5.9	14.5	7.7	-0.9	7.1

These illustrations notwithstanding, there is a wide range of simulated increases in FSP and TANF participation during a recession, even for states with similar policies regarding TANF time limits. It appears that for the Food Stamp Program as a whole, the severity of a recession, rather than the nature of a state's welfare program, is the primary determinant of how much a state's FSP outcomes are likely to change during an economic downturn.