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Briefing Rooms

Farm Risk Management: Government Programs and Risk

Contents
 

Major Risk Management Programs

Over the years, various government programs have been used to achieve risk management policy goals.

  • Multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) was established in the 1930s to cover yield losses from most natural causes. MPCI operated on a somewhat limited basis up through the early 1980s, when insurance availability was greatly expanded and premium subsidies increased in hopes of replacing the disaster payment program. Major reforms legislated in 1994—introduction of a low-cost CAT (catastrophic) coverage level, increased premium subsidies, and a requirement that participants in other farm programs obtain crop insurance—increased participation to over 200 million acres, covering the majority of acres of major field crops planted in the United States.
  • Revenue insurance, a cousin to MPCI, was introduced after the 1994 reforms and has become the most popular form of insurance in some areas. Whereas crop insurance covers only yield losses, revenue insurance pays when gross revenue (yield times price) falls below a specified level.
  • Disaster payments are direct payments to farmers on an emergency basis when crop yields are abnormally low due to adverse growing conditions. During the 1970s, there was a "standing" disaster payments program, with payments made without declaration of a disaster area. Regular payments ceased after 1981, but since then ad hoc disaster payments have been specially approved by the U.S. Congress on a number of occasions.
  • Non-insured assistance program (NAP) payments are made to producers of crops for which crop insurance is unavailable. NAP was created by the 1994 reforms and originally contained an area yield loss trigger in addition to a farm yield loss trigger. The area yield loss requirement was eliminated in the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000.
  • Emergency loans have been provided on various occasions to farmers as part of broad disaster assistance packages. Loans are generally repaid to the government at reduced interest rates.
  • Emergency feed assistance programs have helped livestock producers obtain feed when local pasture, hay, and forage supplies have been limited due to drought or other adverse conditions.
  • Loan deficiency payments (LDPs) protect producers of several major commodities against revenue losses due to low prices. LDPs pay the difference between the government's commodity loan rate and the commodity's loan repayment rate.
  • Marketing loans allow farmers to obtain a loan for their commodity at the loan rate and repay it later at a lower loan repayment rate. The net effect is similar to collecting an LDP payment and selling the commodity. Most farmers prefer the LDP method over a marketing loan.
  • Counter-cyclical payments (CCPs), introduced under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act), are made when market prices fall below legislated levels. The payments may provide income risk protection to producers of several major commodities when crop prices are low.
  • Market loss assistance payments were emergency payments made in 1998, 1999, and 2000 to crop producers. The payments were designed to cushion the shock to farm incomes from both depressed market conditions and declining production flexibility contract payments.

Recent Policy Focus

The 2002 Farm Act has continued major programs from the 1996 Farm Act—marketing loan provisions (loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains) and direct payments for major field crops—and introduced counter-cyclical payments (CCPs). Marketing loans provide income support when crop prices decline. Direct payments, formerly called production flexibility contract payments, are fixed payments based historical production of wheat, rice, upland cotton, feed grains and, beginning with the 2002 Farm Act, soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts. Direct payments are not tied to crop prices or annual plantings. CCPs, also based on historical production, provide income support when prices fall below specified levels.

A number of emergency legislation packages have been enacted in recent years. Disaster assistance in the form of market-loss assistance (for low prices) or crop-loss assistance payments (for low crop yields) was provided to crop producers for the 1998-2001 crop years. Crop insurance premium discounts, in addition to subsidies, were included in 1999 and 2000 disaster assistance packages. Ad hoc crop disaster payments, as well as livestock assistance, were provided by the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003.

Crop insurance remains the major USDA program to help farmers manage risks of crop losses. While participation grew modestly in the late 1990s, some producers considered that crop insurance offered too little coverage and was unaffordable. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 (ARPA) provided an additional $8.2 billion for insurance premium subsidies for 2001-05. ARPA raised premium subsidies with the goal of increasing insurance participation and encouraging use of higher coverage levels.

ARPA also shifted research on crop insurance product development from USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) to the private sector. Privately developed risk management products that have been approved by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (a RMA agency) for subsidies and reinsurance include livestock gross margin and price insurance pilot programs.

As with other policies, issues of program cost, design, and effectiveness are concerns in current risk management policy. In the case of crop insurance, the goals of broad availability, participation, and actuarial performance improved throughout the 1990s, but program costs ncreased at the same time.

In recent years, questions have arisen as to whether differences in the dollar-value equivalent of insurance subsidies across crops might cause farmers to switch from one crop to another, or to plant on land that might not otherwise be cropped. If so, this could affect total crop production and prices, trade, and regional production patterns, and could also have environmental implications. However, preliminary research at ERS suggests the effects of crop insurance on planting decisions are rather small relative to other factors such as crop prices and loan rates.

For Further Details, See...

For more information, contact: Robert Dismukes

Web administration: webadmin@ers.usda.gov

Updated date: February 28, 2005